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Many returned soldiers recollect their wartime experience as the highlight of their lives. 
The phenomenon may be sourced to the nostalgia that springs from the soldier’s 
dissatisfaction with the post-war present, as Christopher Shaw and Malcolm Chase 
suggest (1989).1 Or, it may stem from the powerful emotional charge that soldiers 
experience during wartime when ordinary lives intersect with great events. Samuel 
Hynes has identified the latter and the sense of hyper-meaning it engenders as the spur 
that prompted veterans, including what he calls the ‘one-book men,’ to put pen to page 
(1998: xiv). The veterans’ memories of the Korean War, however, neither fit Shaw and 
Chase’s explanation, nor had the outcome suggested by Hynes. This is the case even 
though US veterans of the Korean War were deeply embittered by their post-war 
treatment by the US government; and, most assuredly, they were aware that the conflict 
in which they were engaged had international ramifications. Instead, until the last 
couple of decades, the stance of many Korean War veterans has been to avoid any 
reference at all to that war or to their own involvement in it. 
 
In this essay I explore the function of cinema in influencing popular understandings of 
the Korean War. I argue that, until very recently, the national and individual narratives 
drawn on that war experience functioned in a ‘memory void’ (Irwin-Zarecka 1989) 
whose most notable characteristic was the absence of the veterans’ own voices, neither 
                                                
1 Stephen Garton (2004) suggests that there are limitations in applying this view of nostalgia to the war 
recollections of Australian diggers from the Great War.  
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heard through a veterans’ organization nor asserted by outspoken family members.2 In 
the aftermath of other, more typical, twentieth century military conflicts, ‘memory 
activists,’ to use Carol Gluck’s term (2007), have occupied the arenas in which national 
and personal narratives of the war were formed and re-contested. By and large, the 
motivation for such memory activism was the commitment to keep at the forefront of 
public discussion the recognition that veterans had made great sacrifices for the nation 
and therefore were entitled to respect and compensation, a campaign that has been led 
strongly by the families (Franklin 1993; Clarke 1979). In marked contrast, only in the 
last couple of decades has the tenor of official policy and national discourse shifted to 
incorporate the Korean War and to pay homage to its veterans by recognizing in them 
the highly valorized qualities of the US fighting man (Keene 2011).3 Against this post-
war landscape, Hollywood cinema played a particular role. Films about the Korean War 
used a set of plots, characters and symbols that offered a powerful explanatory 
possibility. Narrative and plot can serve as the container that gives shape to fragmentary, 
and often inchoate, public and private recollection, while providing the templates of 
meaning and the language with which to evaluate the wartime past.4  
 
The first two parts of my discussion lay out briefly the conjunction of circumstances 
that transformed the conflict in Korea into the ‘forgotten war’ and then examine the 
parallels with other wars in which the articulation of public and private memory has 
been similarly complex. The third part of the essay examines the notion of cinema as the 
enabler of ‘prosthetic memory’ (Landsberg 2004) and the uses and the shortcomings of 
this concept in understanding official and vernacular US memory of the Korean War. 
While offering no omnibus solution to the matter of war, memory, cinema and popular 
understanding, the essay concludes with some suggestions for possible directions in 
future study. 
 
Korea as the ‘forgotten war’  
In his classic study of war and literary memory, The Soldiers’ Tale: Bearing Witness to 
Modern War, Samuel Hynes excludes the Korean War, even though nearly as many US 
                                                
2 Families have provided the drive behind the POW–MIA (Prisoner of War–Missing in Action) 
movement and, combined with the Vietnam Veterans’ organizations, have made the Vietnam veteran a 
recognized figure on the US political landscape.  
3 It is ironic perhaps that the uncovering of battle atrocities by US soldiers in Korea has coincided with 
those soldiers’ inclusion in the pantheon of national military commemoration.  
4 Keith Tribe (1977) examines the transitivity between history and memory and the role of historical films 
in the process.  
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soldiers died in combat in Korea as did later in Vietnam. For Hynes the conflict in 
Korea ‘came and went without glory and left no mark on American imaginations’ 
(1998: xiii–xiv). The fact that John Wayne never made a Korean War film, even though 
in celluloid, and in life, he came to stand for the all-’American’ war hero, and ‘screen-
fought’ in nearly every US conflict at home and abroad, is perhaps part-proof of 
Hynes’s claim (Edwards 1997: 25). The Korean War was not included in the history 
curriculum studied in US schools, and until 1985 there was no specific Korean War 
veterans’ organization to function as the key advocate on the veterans’ affairs.5 
  
Perhaps not surprisingly, the sobriquet most commonly used by returned soldiers and 
commentators in referring to Korea has been that it was the ‘forgotten war.’ Typical 
descriptors evoke the same quality: ‘the invisible,’ ‘the unknown,’ ‘the no-name war’; 
‘the war that nobody wanted’; and even ‘the war that never was’ (Edwards 2000: 27–
39).6 Despite the ubiquitousness of these tags, a far better concept to encompass the 
complex nature of the war’s absence from national commemoration and public 
discourse is Iwona Irwin-Zarecka’s notion of a ‘memory void.’ She employs the term in 
her analysis of how, in Poland, the memory of the historic presence of Jewish culture 
has disappeared, even though for centuries Jews had been a part of the Polish nation. 
The memory void is not a negative vortex. Unlike a planetary black hole that sucks 
matter and material into oblivion, Irwin-Zarecka’s void is a space in which parts of the 
past have disappeared to be replaced by competing pieces of information. As a 
consequence, when we attempt to understand ‘historical silences’ we are ‘forced to 
listen to a great deal of noise’ (2007: 115) . To apply these ideas to understanding the 
Korean War, then, I am suggesting that Hollywood cinema has been a major source of 
the ‘noise’ associated with explanations of the veterans’ part in the war. 
 
Why was the Korean War forgotten? Or to theorize the question more precisely, why 
had the arenas and agencies of memory articulation which, among others, Timothy 
Ashplant, Graham Dawson and Michael Roper have identified as the places where war 
memory is forged and contested, not functioned for the Korean War (Ashplant et al. 
                                                
5 The founders of Graybeards, the newsletter of a section of Korean veterans, have emphasized that they 
found dispiriting the ignorance of many school children, including their own offspring, about Korea. See 
also Fleming and Kaufman (1990) and Edwards (1997: 22–23). The Korean War Veterans’ Association 
was founded in 1985, three decades after the end of the war (Norris 2003: 26–27).  
6 Even in the fine, scholarly study by John Bodnar (1996) there is no entry for Korean War in the index 
and only a brief reference to it in the text.  
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2004: 16–32)?7 And why, in official and private narratives of the war, were the original 
recollections of that experience consigned to a ‘memory void’ to be replaced by 
different pieces of information that connected up into a different narrative. In answering 
these questions, other wartime examples in which the articulation of post-war memory 
has been similarly complex can shed some light.  
 
Southern Irish veterans of World War One who had been volunteers in the British 
Expeditionary Forces were extremely reticent later about it; they were chary of being 
found out of step with the intense nationalism of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and 
Sinn Fein. Rather than risk the possibility of community disapprobation, these old 
soldiers simply suppressed the memory of their earlier pro-British involvement and 
spoke no more about that part of their lives (Leonard 1997). A similar example comes 
from the Malgré-Nous, French citizens in Alsace and Moselle conscripted into the 
German Army in World War Two. Despite what they saw as their lack of choice as 
military draftees, the stories of the Malgré-Nous have never been part of the national 
narrative of victimhood associated with the German occupation of France. As a 
consequence, until quite recently, these French citizens of Alsace and Moselle have kept 
quiet about their lives during World War Two (Thatcher 2011).8 
 
The example of the Algerian War is highly germane as well. The French veterans 
organization, Fédération Nationale des Anciens Combattants d’Algérie-Maroc-Tunisie 
(FNACA), has used various strategies in a vain attempt to overcome their invisibility by 
reinserting the war event and their own part of it into the French national imagination. 
Antoine Prost (2000) and Martin Evans (1997a) offer complementary analyses of the 
process and the reasons for the veterans’ lack of success.9 For Prost, the ‘social framing’ 
of individual and collective memory is the decisive factor. He sets the ‘un-remembered’ 
Algerian War and its veterans and victims within the dense landscape of French war 
memory and the plethora of constituent groups vying to foreground their own stories. 
He also highlights the teleological power of chronology whereby the war for Algerian 
                                                
7 They argue that war memory is always in a state of contestation between families, veterans’ groups and 
the state and, one could add, literary and cinematic producers.  
8 The Bordeaux trial in 1954 of the perpetrators of the massacre at Oradour found that fourteen of the 
twenty-one German SS responsible were Alsatian conscripts, a fact that counteracted the notion of 
Alsatians as German victims (Prost 2000: 174–75).  
9 Interestingly Evans (1997b) notes that the French veterans have tried to apply some of the strategies of 
the US Vietnam veterans’ organization that have been so effective in creating the image of the Vietnam 
vet as a distinctive figure on the US political and cultural landscape. See FNACA’s own website for 
details of its activities (Fédération Nationale 2005). 
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independence has been occluded by the looming presence of World War Two and the 
powerful national myths it generated. In Prost’s view, underlying the lack of support at 
home for France’s military intervention to stop Algerian independence was a 
transfigured discourse about World War Two victims and perpetrators. For many 
French citizens, the image of Algerians resisting the French Army resonated with the 
powerful and recent example in which Frenchmen and women in their own homeland 
had been honoured as patriots and national heroes in recognition of the terrible 
depredations they suffered in resisting the Nazi occupiers.  
 
Prost’s social framing offers much when applied to the Korean War. In a similar way, 
World War Two and the victorious GI provided the foil for the US soldier in Korea. In 
the Pacific War, US soldiers, well nourished, properly equipped and free citizens of a 
democracy, routed the evil Japanese and freed the down-trodden denizens of Imperial 
Nippon. In Europe, the US GIs came as liberators from the New World, bringing with 
them a refreshing vitality and the certainty of victory.10 Unlike these larger than life 
figures, the US soldiers slogging it out on the Korean Peninsula cut poor figures. They 
were immured in a war that at the ceasefire left Korea divided almost exactly as it had 
been three years before, when the fighting had begun. 
 
Martin Evans identifies four constituent elements that determine the valence of a 
particular war in public perception and recall (1997). It is useful to assess the working 
of these factors when applied to Korea. Firstly, in Evans’s template, remembered wars 
tend to possess a ‘temporal coherence.’ That is, there are clear chronological boundaries 
to delineate the start and the end of the conflict. In Algeria this was not so. Similarly, in 
Korea, the war was never declared, remaining officially categorized as a ‘Police 
Action.’ The political reasoning behind this was that it allowed President Truman to 
bypass the US Congress and commit troops to South Korea thereby avoiding the 
possibility that the Congressmen would vote the war down. For veterans, the 
                                                
10 Not just in the Hollywood version. European cinema immediately after the war depicted the US GI, 
well nourished and fully equipped, as an emissary from the future. In Rossellini’s 1945 Roma, città 
aperta (Rome Open City), Pina the virtuous and long-suffering heroine plaintively asks Don Pietro 
whether americani really exist. And in Paisà (1946) Rosellini tracks the contact between Americans and 
Italians; in one episode the US soldiers’ boots are the point of contact between the GI and the young boy 
from the Naples slum. Such portrayals continued in later films as well. In La notti di San Lorenzo (1982; 
The Night of the Shooting Stars), for example, the Taviani brothers’ message could not be clearer: the half 
of the village who head off to find the GIs, the agents of New World health and virtue, are saved; the 
villagers too fearful to leave the old life in the village are destroyed.  
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ramifications of this decision were considerable: it complicated the award of combat 
medals and left veterans resentful that the headstones placed over the US dead in 
combat on the Korean Peninsula could indicate only name, rank and date of death. After 
some protest, the word ‘Korea’ was permitted, but ‘Korean War’ was proscribed 
(Piehler 1995: 157).11  
 
Among the historians of the conflict, disagreements about exactly when the war began have 
fuelled the division between the so-called ‘orthodox’ and the ‘revisionist’ historians. The former 
argue that the war began with the arrival of North Koreans across the 38th parallel in 25 June 
1950, in an aggressive act that provoked the despatch of UN forces. Revisionist scholars, most 
notably the University of Chicago historian, Bruce Cumings, argue that the conditions for the 
civil war began in response to the partition of the nation in August 1945 (2005: 237–67).  
 
Much like the Algerian War, too, there is no hard and fast agreement about when the Korean 
conflict ended. The haggling over an armistice began in mid-1951 but was not finalized until 
mid-1953. And even then the signatories were the USA, for the UN forces, and China for the 
Communist forces. The key adversaries, North and South, signed no agreement with each other. 
With the intense militarization in North and South, both Korean nations have galvanized their 
populations by using the threat of war, which in both places is at the core of national identity 
and the nation state. The USA has never left Seoul and, in the same way, China and the Soviet 
Union continued their involvement with Pyongyang. Most importantly of all, perhaps, there was 
no clear winner. Despite three bloody years of conflict the dividing line between North and 
South Korea barely shifted. 
 
Evans and Prost both underline the absence of sacralized battlefields as a notable factor in the 
public oversight of the Algerian war. Korea is similarly bereft. With no Verduns and no terrain 
to equal the Somme—many of the bloody Korean combat confrontations took place north of the 
38th parallel—Korea has lacked the sites of memorial commemoration where over decades 
public memory could coalesce. Although the South Korean government has created war 
memorials in Seoul and Pusan, they have never been successful in attracting the non-Korean 
visitors that the monuments and cemeteries have enjoyed on the western front in the Great War 
or as have the combat sites in World War Two.  
                                                
11 Australian veterans from Korea have also complained bitterly that the official designation as a ‘police 
action’ has denied them the combat medals that have been the automatic right of Australian veterans from 
other wars. For Australia’s part in the war, see Trembath (2005).  
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In a very important sense, however, the Korean War is unlike the Algerian War. The Korean 
conflict has not lacked a ‘consensual imagery,’ a factor that Evans and Prost regard as 
fundamental in public memory formation. Indeed the solidity of the image of the Korean 
combatant has dogged the Korean veterans’ movement. Just as World War One conjures up a 
muddied soldier in the trenches, and a khaki-clad and helmeted GI in a jeep epitomizes World 
War Two, the Korean War evokes the figure of a prisoner of war: emaciated, defeated and—
when mediated through Cold War fears—likely to be untrustworthy, and possibly even 
brainwashed to be a communist sympathiser.  
 
The most notable feature of the Korean War was the high proportion of soldiers who 
were taken into captivity. Between 1950 and 1953, some 7,100 US soldiers became 
prisoners of war. In those desperate conditions, the death rate for US prisoners was 
thirty eight percent, nearly four times higher than that of their counterparts in World 
War Two (Davis 2000: 7).12 In general, the POW is a problematic figure for official 
military discourse and in the popular perception of military events. Prost catalogues the 
dispiriting fact that during World War Two French POWs were always distrusted by 
French veterans who suspected that their POW comrades had preferred surrender to 
combat.13 The prisoner of war is the antithesis of the fighting man: the POW is defeated, 
weak, emaciated and dependent for survival on the enemy. As well, captivity is a 
feminizing process: the transformation from soldier to prisoner involves the loss of 
body mass and the consignment to serve the rest of the war sealed off from combat 
behind barbed wire. In a masculinist military ideology the imprisoned can retain the 
soldierly mien by escaping; and, in war literature and cinema, narratives of escape 
constitute a whole genre. Perhaps the quintessential example is Jean Renoir’s movie La 
grande illusion (1937). As the career French officer, the aristocrat Captain Boldieu 
states: ‘just as the tennis court is for playing tennis, and a horse is for riding, a prisoner 
of war camp is for escaping from.’ And this is exactly what the heroic group of ordinary 
                                                
12 In the first months of captivity the ratios were much higher. Between 25 June 1950 and 27 July 1953, 
1,789,000 US troops were sent to serve in Korea, of whom some 34,000 were killed, 103,000 wounded 
and more than 8,000 were reported unaccounted for. In the course of the war, of the 7,000 US servicemen 
captured, almost 3,000 perished. Of Koreans, three million were killed, five million were left homeless in 
the South, and half a million civilians in the North met their deaths as a result of US bombing (Young 
2001; ‘US Military Korean War Statistics’ 2010). 
13 Though undoubtedly victims of the war, French POWs, unwelcome in the established associations of 
returned soldiers, eventually formed their own separate veterans’ organization (Prost 2000: 173). 
Australian POWs returning from Japanese captivity were often accused of being ‘quitters.’  
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French soldiers, interned as POWs of the Germans, proceed to do.14 That it was 
impossible for foreign POWs to escape in North Korea in no way lessened the popular 
imperative that they should have done so.15  
 
In the case of US POWs, it was not simply a matter of representation. Their identity and 
integrity in North Korean captivity was compromised by the fact that, for whatever 
reason, a good number of them were drawn into the sorts of activities that had been rare 
in previous wars. The American Monitoring Service picked up more than 250 
broadcasts made by American POWs praising communism and castigating the 
capitalism of their homeland. Many signed Peace Pledges and wrote articles that named 
the USA as the prime cause of the war. This behaviour caused consternation at home 
and was a source of embarrassment to families and veterans after the war. On their 
return to the USA, every POW was interrogated on the ships that brought them back. 
Many were passed through two and three levels of interrogation panels and, once back 
on home soil, rafts of files were passed on to the FBI to collect further testimony. In 
some cases, FBI agents were still dogging certain individuals well into the 1970s.16 The 
fear was that in a cold war of ideologies, communists were easily able to ‘brainwash’ 
US prisoners.  
 
The daily press during and after the war referred to US soldiers as suffering from ‘give-
up-itis,’ a condition described as a contagious tendency to quit and die under fire. And it 
was attributed to the weakness of the society in which these men had been raised.17 The 
responsibility for this supposedly lamentable state of affairs, so many claimed, was a 
combination of the soft life of youth after 1945 and their having been emasculated by an 
overbearing ‘Momism.’ As a popular book of the time explained, the ethos of the 
spineless sissy had become predominant with the ‘electrification of the American home’ 
                                                
14 Jay Winter (2001) notes that La grande illusion was the first choice of French war veterans for films to 
be placed in a French museum to World War One.  
15 It is important to point out the material differences between US prisoners in North Vietnam and those 
held in North Korea. US POWs in Hanoi were predominantly flyers, older than the general cohort of US 
soldiers in Vietnam, well educated and had occupied senior positions of command. Equally importantly, 
many were blessed with outspoken and assertive families who had access at officer levels to the military 
hierarchy. The Korean veterans were younger and their educational levels were low; in fact many had 
joined up in 1950 because the military offered the only jobs available. Carrying no clout at home, their 
families were poor and unused to speaking out. For detailed biographies of the ex-POWs among these 
men, see the interrogation reports cited in the footnote below.  
16 See the files archived in the Records of the Office of Judge Advocate General (Army) (1995).  
17 In one strand of the debate about the causes of these cultural shortcomings, responsibility was sheeted 
home to single mothers who had raised boys to be sissies. See Robin (2001), especially chapter 8.  
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(Wylie 1955: 199). With household appliances replacing housework, mothers in the 
USA had become obsolete. Left with no activities in which to expend pent up female 
energy, women found relief by interfering in the lives of their children, especially the 
young males (215).18  
 
Eugene Kinkead, in an article in The New Yorker from 26 October 1957, alerted readers 
to what he warned was ‘something new in American history.’ The Korean conflict had 
brought the ‘wholesale breakdown of morale and the wholesale collaboration with the 
captors’ (Kinkead 1959: 10). In previous wars, according to Kinkead, no matter the 
‘rigors of the camps,’ a ‘respectable number of prisoners’ managed to escape. Thus, the 
failures of US prisoners in Korea demonstrated the breakdown of the ‘entire cultural 
pattern, which produced these young American soldiers’ (1959: 15).19 His concerns 
were echoed strongly within the military. After much analysis based on the information 
collected from the hundreds of interrogations of returning Korean POWs, Eisenhower in 
1955 introduced a Military Code of Conduct. It laid down five principles of behaviour 
for soldiers in captivity, the first two being: try to resist; and try to escape.20 
 
Many returning US prisoners from Korea resented their treatment in the mandatory 
interrogations they experienced on the homebound journey. Not surprisingly, too, others 
were embittered by the lengthy clearance procedures they endured before back pay and 
service pensions were paid. Even more painful, if the POW’s own accounts are any 
indication, was the general indifference to their wartime travails, at the worst bordering 
on mistrust, that too often characterised their reception at home. Confronted with such a 
dispiriting state of affairs, a great many ex-POWs and repatriated veterans simply chose 
a strategy of self-preservation. They spoke as little as possible about the Korea war and 
their own part in it. These ex-POWs attempted, often at the expense of their future 
mental wellbeing, to excise from memory that part of their lives that constituted Korea. 
                                                
18 Wylie’s book struck a deep chord. Adam Zweiback points out that it was reprinted twenty times 
between 1942 and 1955 (1998: 348). The need to explain the dissatisfaction of suburban women in the 
USA prompted Betty Friedan to write The Feminine Mystique in 1963. Friedan’s feminist solution to 
obsolete housewifery and motherhood was to urge women to use their energy to leave home and seek 
paid work in the public domain.  
19 Reputable psychologists and various committees of professionals within the Department of Defense 
denied there had been brainwashing; but these expert opinions did little to assuage popular belief that 
communists possessed sinister powers of mind and thought control. Also, the scientific denials of 
brainwashing had the perverse effect of highlighting the supposed poor calibre of the men themselves as 
the reason for their failure.  
20 The others were: make no ‘deals’; love your (compatriot who is) brother; establish seniority and follow 
it. For discussion of the significance of these ‘first principles’ of combat and captivity, see Mayer (1957).  
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Instead they tried to take up the threads of their pre-war lives as though their Korean 
sojourn had never happened.21 
 
Cinema as prosthetic memory 
Within the void surrounding the reticence of the returned Korean veterans, it is 
interesting to look at Hollywood’s potential to construct a coherent popular memory of 
the war.22 Alison Landsberg has coined the term ‘prosthetic memory’ for what she 
posits is a new form of cultural memory (2004).23 In it the ‘new technologies of mass 
consumption’ have enabled the creation of affective experience that can create a ‘bodily 
memory,’ even though its possessor has not lived through the original event. Landsberg 
surveys a range of enabling modalities, including the contemporary museum and the 
historical reenactment, but in this essay the application of the concept to historical 
cinema is relevant. The phenomenon of reinscribed memory is not new. Several decades 
ago, Roland Barthes identified the circular process whereby subsequent memories are 
laid down and reinscribed over existing ones (1975). Film theorists have long known, 
too, that the viewer’s exposure to the screened experience carries a powerful emotional 
charge. Almost all cinemagoers (and, indeed, it is one of the addictive qualities of the 
medium) experience the out-of-body transcendence that occurs when the viewer’s own 
self is engulfed by the events on the screen and, unshackled from the quotidian realm, 
left free to share the highs and lows of life with the movie characters.24 Cinema viewing 
is a somatic experience engaging the sense of sight and sound and frequently—in 
happiness, horror and sexual arousal—the body’s autonomic, physical response. These 
bodily experiences take place in what is sometimes called ‘transferential space,’ but 
more straightforwardly can be understood as the transformation that occurs when 
                                                
21 Carlson (2002) interviewed these reserved and reticent men with skill and sensitivity and teased out 
many of their life testimonies. In the foreword to a book co-written with a US POW in Korea (Bassett & 
Carlson 2003), Carlson pulls no punches in describing these ex-prisoners as the ‘most maligned victims 
of all American wars’ and that after the treatment they have received they are legitimately suspicious of 
the motives of those who profess interest in their wartime experiences. See also my discussion of the 
trauma engendered by self-censorship (2011).  
22 It is interesting to note that FNACA approached the great French film director Bertrand Tavernier to 
make La guerre sans nom (1992) that draws on the first person oral testimonies of their members. It is 
hard to know if the film achieved the hoped-for objective of increasing the understanding of the veterans’ 
wartime contribution and their place in the national wartime narrative.  
23 See also Landsberg’s analysis of an embodied Holocaust memory unhooked from the survivor 
memories of the living (1997).  
24 Woody Allen’s The Purple Rose of Cairo (1985) plays with the notion of the possibility of the viewer 
crossing the boundaries between real life and the fictional world on the screen. And it was exactly to 
prevent this slippage between the real and the imagined that Bertold Brecht employs techniques of 
distantiation in order that the audience will understand that the stage offers exemplars of life and political 
choices that must separately be achieved by the viewer’s own struggle in the real world.  
Keene        War, Cinema, Prosthetic Memory 
 
PORTAL, vol. 7, no. 1, January 2010.  11 
watching a movie brings an epistemological shift in personal subjectivity or political 
and social understanding. This is when the viewer’s own previous knowledge intersects 
and is transformed by the new knowledge from the world on the screen. For the 
individual experiencing it, a private epistemological transformation may be pleasurable 
but is not necessarily so. Alistair Thompson has reported the unease of Anzac veterans 
from the Great War when their own privately recollected wartime experiences did not 
accord with Peter Weir’s 1981 depiction of Australian soldierly life in Gallipoli 
(Thompson 1994: 25) . 
 
Landsberg’s ‘prosthetic memory’ includes the ideas above but as well suggests that new 
memories, what I have tagged as the outcome of a cinema-derived epistemological shift, 
can circulate widely and become part of the ‘personal archive of experience’ of a great 
many individuals who have not themselves seen the film, or any other modality of 
memory generation. She offers the example that the modern technologies of mass media 
have created a new, shared (prosthetic) memory of ‘American’-ness that has been a 
positive force in easing the incorporation of a series of new immigrant and African-
American cohorts into the ‘American’ nation. Perhaps Landsberg is overly optimistic in 
concluding that because the new, shared memory is not anchored in the ownership of 
any particular ethnic group or generation, prosthetic memory has the potential to create 
a more open and inclusive society.25 Without diminishing the originality and usefulness 
of her prosthetic paradigm, it is probably closer to the mark to see prosthetic memory as 
a generic process that might as equally serve propagandists and xenophobes as those 
who aspire to inclusivity and internationalism.  
 
Before applying some of these ideas to Hollywood’s depiction of the Korean War, it is 
worth noting that there were not a great many films made about the war.26 This in turn 
may have strengthened the impact of those films that did circulate, as fewer versions 
reduced the competing cacophony within the ‘noise’ that filled the memory void 
surrounding the Korean War. I examine only two of the best known Korean War movies 
                                                
25 For Landsberg’s optimism about the possibilities of the process, see the epilogue to Prosthetic Memory 
(2004: 141–55).  
26 David Slocum has identified 91 films (2006: 6). Edwards notes that no more than three dozen films 
were made during the war and probably no more than 100 have been made about the conflict. These 
figures are in stark contrast with the more than 500 movies made about World War Two between 1940 
and 1945, and the great number made during the early 1950s, exactly while the Korean War was being 
fought (Edwards 1997: vii).  
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with a view to seeing how they might construct, whether as prosthesis or not, a popular 
understanding of the Korean conflict.  
 
Without a doubt, Frank Sinatra is the best-known Korean War veteran for his portrayal 
of the hero in The Manchurian Candidate (1962), the film directed by John 
Frankenheimer that was a box office hit when released and subsequently has retained a 
popular, if not cult, following. The story in broad brush is widely known even by those 
who have not seen the movie and, in an effect that accords with Landsberg’s theory, The 
Manchurian Candidate has become a term in the lexicon of Cold War language. The 
Sinatra-figure and his travails are compressed in popular discourse to stand in for the 
potential consequences in the struggle against sinister communist forces. As Major 
Bennett Marco, Sinatra played the repatriated ex-POW who is plagued by flashbacks of 
disturbing incidents. Finally he figures out that his fragmentary memories are of a 
shocking event that indeed occurred during the communist brainwashing sessions that 
he and his unit endured in a POW camp in Korea. By sheer strength of will Sinatra’s 
character has held on to his pre-war identity, at the core of which is loyalty to ‘America’ 
and the US Army. He realizes that the communist goons in his nightmares have also 
programmed his POW buddy, Sergeant Raymond Shaw, in order to turn him into an 
automaton bent on killing the US president. Sinatra sets out on a desperate quest to find 
Shaw and abort the communists’ malignant mission. The strength of the Sinatra-
character’s patriotism and determination is there for all to see when he spurns a sexual 
dalliance with Eugenie Rose Chaney (played by Janet Leigh) because it might deflect 
him from his patriotic task.  
 
Shaw’s mother, played by Angela Lansbury, is a domineering ‘Mom,’ an exemplar of 
the type that supposedly had jeopardized the US family in the 1950s. Lansbury’s 
character has hatched a diabolical scheme intended to ensure that her son is recognized 
as a Korean War hero, which then will aid her master plan to place her second 
husband—a downtrodden weakling who parrots Senator Jo McCarthy—in line for 
nomination as US president. In an extraordinary development, it is revealed that 
Lansbury’s Mom-figure is actually a secret Communist agent who has masterminded 
the assassination of the President by the brainwashed veteran so that Shaw’s stepfather 
will take over the White House. With Shaw’s mother exercising the real power, the 
communists will be in command. In a suspense-filled finale Sinatra’s Marco finds Shaw 
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in a box high above the national political convention, the sights of his high-powered 
rifle focussed on the president and his party on the podium far below. When the fateful 
shot is fired, however, instead of assassinating the president, Shaw’s mother and her 
husband fall dead on the stage. The reassuring message, presumably, is that in the end 
patriotism will override brainwashing. An equally valid reading may be that the only 
way to be free of evil, overbearing Moms is to shoot them. In either case, the audience 
is relieved that the two ex-Korean POWs have survived the horror of being brainwashed 
and returned to rid the USA of its implacable communist enemy. 
 
In a different, but equally well-known, vein is the 1959 combat film Pork Chop Hill, 
directed by Lewis Milestone. Based on a true wartime incident, it was made with the 
cooperation of the US Department of Defense. The field commander, played 
wonderfully by Gregory Peck, leads a small infantry unit ordered to hold Pork Chop 
Hill that is besieged by a teeming force of Chinese soldiers. The US soldiers have been 
ordered on this mission even though it has no military importance except that holding 
off the Chinese Army in some way or another will help the US negotiations in 
Pyongyang. The soldiers under Peck’s command (as will any fair-minded viewer) 
consider that they are being carelessly abandoned to slaughter. Predictably, Gregory 
Peck’s character is a patriotic soldier and a commander with integrity. He obeys the 
orders that he has been given. Folksy and honourable, he keeps his men on track even 
though they, and he, know that they are in a fatal predicament.  
 
The movie tracks individual responses to the danger. The US unit is constantly 
bombarded with Chinese radio broadcasts, from male and female broadcasters, urging 
them to give up and cross the lines to join their class brothers. There is a black GI who 
gives signs of unpatriotic intentions: self-interest in survival rather than unswerving 
commitment to combat. His behaviour suggests that the communists’ radio appeal has 
found its mark. He hides in the scrub and it seems that he is preparing to cross into 
enemy territory. Peck as commander pulls him back into line and magnanimously gives 
him another chance to show his patriotism by putting his life on the line for his country. 
The African-American rises to the occasion and fights fearlessly in a terrible Chinese 
onslaught. But the whole incident is unsettling. The subtext of the narrative signals that 
probably when Peck turns his back or is too tired to be vigilant, this African-American 
GI will be off across the lines to join the Chinese. Although it is impossible to know 
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what might have been the effect of the political context at home on both the director and 
the contemporary viewer, at the time of the film’s release, the FBI and the Judge 
Advocate General were still combing through the files of ex-POW repatriates, collecting 
extra oral testimonies from returned veterans with a view to prosecution.27 Another 
archetypal character, and probably also instantly recognizable, is the Japanese-
American ‘retread’ from World War Two. We learn that he is one of the Fighting 42nd. 
The only Japanese-American unit permitted in World War Two, they went on to be 
ferocious and highly distinguished fighting men. In Pork Chop Hill he is fearless, 
patriotic and utterly reliable in combat and in command. An additional underlying 
message of the film, that most likely would have been picked up by the US audience, 
emphasises the valour of the World War Two veteran in contrast with what is 
highlighted as the wavering uncertainty of the US soldier in Korea. 
 
Conclusion 
Certainly, cinema offers stories that explore ‘central issues of popular experience and 
consciousness,’ as Peter Sjolyst-Jackson points out in a study of British and Norwegian 
films about the Second World War (2004). It is also the case that cinema narratives are 
containers for the organization of private memory. Landsberg, with her notion of 
‘prosthetic memory,’ however, goes further. She argues that film is a modality of mass 
communication with the power to create collective memories that are unhooked from 
the process of screen viewing. All of this is clearly useful, and intuitively makes a good 
deal of sense. I have flagged the ways in which the memory void caused by the 
documented reticence of ex-Korean POWs may provide a space for the articulation of 
popular messages about the Korea War that are derived from cinema. There are, 
however, real and insurmountable theoretical drawbacks if this approach to cinema and 
popular understanding is thought to constitute the whole explanation.  
 
The relationship between popular film and social memory is complex and hard to 
disentangle. Sue Harper raises this point in relation to British films during World War 
Two (1997: 163). However, her concerns, mostly with memory, take her away from 
                                                
27 This is not the place to go into detail, but it would be misleading not to point out that of the 2,281 
intelligence reports on individuals marked in 1954 as possible collaborators, and, therefore needing 
further attention, in the end only 192 men were charged with serious offences. Of those only 68 were 
dishonourably discharged. Trauma and tribulation, however, were experienced by all those men and their 
families. Whether innocent or not, they were subject to the abrasive intrusion of official surveillance and 
heavy-handed scrutiny (Keene 2011).  
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what I see as the core problem. She is unhappy with the tag ‘popular,’ which she 
suggests is too close to notions of ‘folk’ memory and also to Foucault’s idea that the 
adjective signifies narratives suppressed in the hegemonic discourse. Harper’s 
preference is for ‘mass memory’ because she can then refigure her concern to ask about 
the ‘precise relationship between commercially successful films and the mass 
audience’s sense of national identity and interest’ (1997: 164–66). Her methodological 
response to this important question, however, is to take an empirical approach that looks 
at British film attendance with the presumption that it will provide insight into which 
films drew large audiences, from which she can conclude that their filmic messages had 
broad appeal. As useful as this may be, it in no manner reconciles the main problems: 
the gap between knowing the story of the film, and even the surrounding contemporary 
events and how many people were in the audience, but having no certainty about what it 
is exactly that the viewer took from the film; and what of that she may have 
incorporated into her own fund of personal understanding.  
 
 In critiquing a set of essays on World War Two and national cinemas, Jay Winter 
(2001) suggests that film studies can learn from literary history, a field in which it is 
recognized that the two elements—reading and reception—are at the core of the 
literary-historical enterprise. And, in order to approach the impact of cinema in any 
degree, it is equally necessary first to deconstruct the film’s message and then take the 
second step of decoding the meaning of the message as it is received. Winter’s 
observations are apposite, including the fact that the consumer’s decoding of cinema is 
central, even though it is extremely complex to carry off correctly. The same 
phenomenon that makes the movies such a rich medium for personal experience also 
makes difficult any assay into film reception. Individuals bring their own frames of 
meaning to each film viewing. And each reviewing, including of the same film, is a 
fresh experience because the framing process itself is discursive and in a constant state 
of formulation. The latter may be prompted by the unfolding experience of everyday life 
or by the epistemological shift that was brought by the previous exposure to the film.  
 
Two possible strategies suggest themselves in confronting the unreliability of popular 
understandings derived from cultural and cinematic representation. The first is to be 
meticulous in the terms that one uses within the analytical process in order never to lose 
sight of their specific limitations. For example, the researcher must be wary of any 
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slippage from a discussion about the themes within a film’s content into any 
straightforward conclusion about the incorporation of these themes into collective 
memory. Second, as a way of uncovering the connection between exposure to narratives 
and the representation of events and the epistemological shift such exposure has caused, 
it may be useful to draw on autobiographical reflection. Oral testimony, for example, 
can offer a good deal when individuals are encouraged to reflect on their own 
subjectivity over time and on what they may see as the catalysts of change. Here, the 
Korean War offers interesting terrain. Particularly notable, and of immense interest to 
the scholar of individual and collective mentalities, is the work of an historian like 
Lewis Carlson (2002) who has meticulously collected the testimonies of hundreds of 
Korean veterans. Even more, Carlson has provided them with the space in which to 
recall not just the three years of their war service in Korea, but to ruminate on the effect 
of these experiences on the long span of the remainder of their lives.28 While this can 
never provide absolute proof, when sensitively used with careful analysis, it may be 
possible to at least approach the subjectivity shifts in veterans’ memories and draw 





In writing this paper, a work in progress within a larger project, I have been greatly helped by discussions 
with Elizabeth Rechniewski and by the comments of the anonymous reviewers for this journal. I also 
thank Della Adams for her generosity in Memphis in December 2009 in talking to me about her own life 
and that of her parents in China and in the USA, which raises profound questions about personal 
subjectivity and its representation in different modes of narration. 
                                                
28 As well as recording oral histories, Carlson has facilitated the publication of several powerful memoirs 
by Korean veterans. Notable in this outstanding group is the memoir of Clarence Adams (2007), which 
Carlson and Della Adams, the daughter of Clarence Adams, have compiled. In a narrative unencumbered 
with sentimentality or self-justification, Adams reflects on his life before and after Korea, including 
twelve years in China and his family’s experiences after returning to the USA. 
Keene        War, Cinema, Prosthetic Memory 
 
PORTAL, vol. 7, no. 1, January 2010.  17 
Reference list  
Adams, C. 2007, An American Dream: The Life of an African American Soldier and POW Who Spent 
Twelve Years in Communist China. University of Massachusetts Press, Boston. 
Allen, W. (dir.) 1985, The Purple Rose of Cairo, motion picture, Orion Pictures Corporation. 
Ashplant, T. G., Dawson, G. & Roper M. (eds) 2004, The Politics of Memory: Commemorating War. 
Transaction Publishers, London. 
Barthes, R. 1975, The Pleasure of the Text. Hill & Wang, New York. 
Bassett, R. M., with Carlson, L. H. 2003, And the Wind Blew Cold. Kent State University Press, Kent, 
Ohio. 
Bodnar, J. 1996, Remaking America: Public Memory, Commemoration and Patriotism in the Twentieth 
Century. Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ. 
Carlson, L. H. 2002, Remembered Prisoners of a Forgotten War: An Oral History of Korean War POWs. 
Macmillan, St Martin’s Press, New York. 
Clarke, D. L. 1979, The Missing Man: Politics and the MIA. National Defense University, Research 
Directorate, Washington, DC. 
Chase, C. & Shaw, M. (eds) 1989, The Imagined Past: History and Nostalgia. Manchester University 
Press, Manchester; New York. 
Cumings, B. 2005, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History. WW Norton, New York. 
Edwards, P. M. 1997, A Guide to Film on The Korean War. Greenwood Press, Westport, CN. 
_____ 2000, To Acknowledge a War: The Korean War in American Memory. Greenwood Press, Westport, 
CN. 
Evans, M. 1997a, ‘Rehabilitating the Traumatized War Veteran: The Case of French Conscripts from the 
Algerian War, 1954–1962,’ in War and Memory in the Twentieth Century, (eds) M. Evans & K. 
Lunn. Berg, Oxford, 73–85. 
_____ 1997b, The Memory of Resistance: French Opposition to the Algerian War, 1954–1962. Berg, 
Oxford.  
Evans, M. & Lunn, K. (eds) 1997, War and Memory in the Twentieth Century. Berg, Oxford. 
Fédération Nationale des Anciens Combattants d’Algérie-Maroc-Tunisie (FNACA). 2005, official 
website. Online, available: http://www.fnaca.org/page.asp?IDPAGE=298 [accessed 17 April 2010]. 
Franklin, H. B. 1993, M.I.A. or Mythmaking in America. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick.  
Fleming, D. B. and Kaufman, B. I. 1990, ‘The Forgotten War: Korea,’ Education Digest, vol. 56, no. 4 
(December), 71–72.  
Frankenheimer, J. (dir.) 1962, The Manchurian Candidate, motion picture, MC Productions/United 
Artists. 
Friedan, B. 1963, The Feminine Mystique. WW Norton & Co., New York. 
Garton, S. 2004, ‘Longing For War: Nostalgia and the Australian Returned Soldiers after the First World 
War,’ in The Politics of Memory: Commemorating War, (eds) T. Ashplant, G. Dawson & M. 
Roper. Transaction Publishers, London, 222–39. 
Gluck, C. 2007, ‘Operations of Memory: Comfort Women and the World,’ in Ruptured Histories: War 
Memory and the Post-Cold War in Asia, (eds) S. M. Jager & R. Mitter. Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, MA, 47–77. 
Harper, S. 1997, ‘Popular Film, Popular Memory: The case of the Second World War,’ in War and 
Memory in the Twentieth Century, (eds) M. Evans & K. Lunn. Berg, Oxford, 163–176. 
Hynes, S. 1998, The Soldiers’ Tale: Bearing Witness to Modern War. London, Penguin. 
Irwin-Zarecka, I. 1989, Neutralizing Memory: The Jew in Contemporary Poland. Transaction Publishers, 
New Brunswick, NJ. 
_____ 2007, Frames of Remembrance: The Dynamics of Collective Memory. Transaction Publishers, 
London. 
Keene, J. 2011 (forthcoming), ‘Lost and Found to Public Commemoration: American Veterans of the 
“Forgotten” Korean War,’ Journal of Social History. 
Kinkead, E. 1959, In Every War but One. WW Norton, New York. 
Landsberg, A. 1997, ‘America, the Holocaust and the Mass Culture of Memory: Towards a Radical 
Politics of Empathy,’ New German Critique, no. 71 (Spring-Summer), 63–86. 
_____ 2004, Prosthetic Memory: The Transformation of American Remembrance in the Age of Mass 
Culture. Columbia University Press, New York. 
Leonard, J. 1997, ‘Facing “The Finger of Scorn”: Veterans’ Memories of Ireland after the Great War,’ in 
War and Memory in the Twentieth Century, (eds) M. Evans and K. Lunn. Berg, Oxford, 59–73. 
Keene        War, Cinema, Prosthetic Memory 
 
PORTAL, vol. 7, no. 1, January 2010.  18 
Mayer, Major W. E. 1957, Freedom Forum Presentation. Communist Indoctrination: Its Significance to 
Americans. Distributed by the National Education Program, Arkansas. 
Milestone, L. (dir.) 1959, Pork Chop Hill, motion picture, Melville Productions/United Artists. 
Norris, W. T. 2003, ‘The Forming of the Korean War Veterans’ Association,’ Graybeards (March/April), 
26-27. 
Piehler, G. K. 1995, Remembering War the American Way. Smithsonian Institution Press, Washington, 
DC, and London. 
Prost, A. 2000, ‘The Algerian War in French Collective Memory,’ in War and Remembrance in the 
Twentieth Century, (eds) J. Winter & E. Sivan. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 161–76. 
Records of the Office of Judge Advocate General (Army). 1995, Record Group 153, RECAP-K program 
case files, United States National Archive and Record Administration, College Park, Maryland. 
Online, available: http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/153.html#153.13.2 
[Accessed 17 April 2010]. 
Renoir, J. (dir.) 1937, La grande illusion (The Grand Illusion), motion picture, Réalisation d’Art 
Cinématographique. 
Robin, R. 2001, The Making of the Cold War Enemy: Culture and Politics in the Military Intellectual 
Complex. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. 
Rossellini. R. (dir.). 1945, Roma, città aperta (Rome Open City), motion picture, Excelsa Film. 
_____ (dir.) 1946, Paisà, motion picture, Organizzazione Film Internazionali. 
Sjølyst-Jackson, P. 2004, ‘Remembered/Replayed: The Nation and Male Subjectivity in the Second 
World War Films Ni Liv (Norway) and The Cruel Sea (Britain),’ in The Politics of Memory: 
Commemorating War, (eds) T. Ashplant, G. Dawson and M. Roper. Transaction Publishers, 
London, 165–81. 
Slocum, D. 2006, Hollywood and War: The Film Reader. Routledge, New York. 
Tavernier, B. (dir.) 1992, La guerre sans nom (The War with No Name), motion picture, Neuf de Coeur. 
Taviani, P. & V. 1982, La notti di San Lorenzo (The Night of the Shooting Stars), motion picture, 
Radiotelevisione Italiana. 
Thatcher, N. 2011 (forthcoming), ‘The Malgré-nous: Unfolding a Second World War drama,’ Australian 
Journal of French Studies. 
Thompson, A. 1994, Anzac Memories: Living with the Legend. Oxford University Press, Melbourne. 
Trembath, R. 2005, A Different Sort of War: Australians in Korea 1950-53. Australian Scholarly 
Publishing, Melbourne. 
Tribe, K. 1977, ‘History and the Production of Memories,’ Screen, vol. 18, no. 4 (Winter), 9–22. 
‘US Military Korean War Statistics.’ 2010. The Korean War website, compiled by Ed Evanhoe. Online, 
available: http://www.korean-war.com/miakia.html [Accessed 17 April 2010].  
Weir, P. (dir.) 1981, Gallipoli, motion picture, Australian Film Commission. 
Winter, J. 2001, ‘Film and the Matrix of Memory,’ AHR Forum on World War Two and National 
Cinemas, American Historical Review, vol. 106, no. 3 (June), 857–64. 
Wylie, P. 1955, Generation of Vipers. 3rd edition. Rinehart, New York. 
Young, M. B. 2001, ‘Korea: The Post-war War,’ History Workshop Journal, Issue 5, 112–26. 
Zweiback A. J. 1998, ‘The 21 “Turncoat GIs”: Non-repatriations and the Political Culture of the Korean 
War,’ The Historian, vol. 60, no. 2 (Winter), 334–62. 
